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 Abstract:  Dignity is one of the most controversial and yet commonly used terms in debates 
regarding end-of-life issues. The term “dignity” can take various meanings. For example, it 
can be used to denote the respect owed to an individual person, or to signify the intrinsic 
value of humankind as a whole. These two different understandings of dignity inevitably 
lead to different approaches to end-of-life decisionmaking. 
 This article explores the meaning of the term “dignity” in two European countries, 
England and France. Our analysis compares public debates and legislation on end-of-life-
related issues in these two countries. We argue that in England dignity is most commonly 
understood as respect for individual autonomy, whereas in France dignity usually signifi es 
respect for humanity as a whole. We demonstrate that the difference in the conceptualization 
of the term leads to different ethical, and hence legal and practical, approaches to end-of-life 
issues and vulnerable patients. Our particular focus is on (1) withdrawing/withholding life-
sustaining treatment, (2) respect for patient preferences, and (3) assistance in dying. 
 Given the difference in the understanding of dignity, and the underlying philosophical 
approaches, it appears that there is still a long way to go before we can establish common 
guidelines on end-of-life decisions across Europe and beyond. However, clarifying the use 
of the term “dignity” in different discussions around Europe could hopefully facilitate this 
endeavor. 
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 Introduction 
 Dignity is a highly debatable concept. Many different meanings have been pro-
posed in ethical and political debates, but a consensus has not been reached.  1  The 
lack of a clear defi nition of dignity has given rise to controversy and confusion. 
Some authors defend the term,  2 , 3 , 4  whereas others reject it as a useless one in bio-
ethics.  5  However, dignity remains a prominent concept in international bioethics 
guidelines and regulations. For example, the 1997 European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine,  6  the UNESCO’s 1997 Universal Declaration on the 
Genome and Human Rights  7  and the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights  8  all invoke human dignity and the obligation to respect it as the 
basis of restrictions and obligations in biomedical practice. 
 Respect for dignity is invoked as one of the fundamental principles in moral 
debates and international guidelines on end-of-life issues. More specifi cally, 
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine presents 
the obligation to seek patient consent for each health intervention, implying the 
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right to refuse treatment, as a way of respecting dignity and individual freedoms. 
The convention is endorsed by the majority of European countries, including 
England and France. These countries have an obligation to implement the direc-
tives of the convention nationally. However, national approaches to this imple-
mentation can differ markedly. One of the reasons for this discrepancy among 
countries can be the different meanings of the term “dignity” and the different 
forms respect for human dignity can take.  9  It is, therefore, important to explore the 
different meanings of dignity in an attempt to illuminate its use in the debates  10  
and thus facilitate dialogue among countries.  11  
 In this article we focus on two countries, England and France, and the way the 
international directive regarding respect for dignity has been translated at a 
national level. We examine the legal approach to end-of-life practices in England 
and France and also investigate the meaning of the term “dignity” as it appears in 
public policies and national guidelines. 
 We argue that in England respect for dignity is mainly understood as respect for 
autonomy, whereas in France respect for dignity is mainly understood as respect 
for humanity, solidarity, and public order. We conclude that international guide-
lines that invoke contentious terms like “dignity” cannot lead to harmonization of 
policy and practice at a European level and suggest that in order for harmoniza-
tion of policy and practice to be achieved, the meaning of the term needs to be 
defi ned. 
 Legal Approaches to End-of-Life Practices in England 
 Efforts to establish respect for patient dignity have already appeared in interna-
tional documents. As mentioned previously, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine emphasizes the obligation to seek free and 
informed consent from patients, prior to any health intervention (Article 5), as 
essential to the respect for patient dignity and freedoms (Article 1). Furthermore, 
the convention requires healthcare providers to show respect for the dignity and 
freedom of patients by taking into account their wishes regarding end-of-life 
treatment. However, France and England have adopted different ways of fulfi ll-
ing this obligation, by ascribing a different legal status to patients’ wishes to 
refuse treatment.  12  
 In English common law, a patient’s right to refuse treatment is based on the 
principle of bodily integrity, fi rst introduced by William Blackstone in 1765.  13  
As long as patients are duly informed and have understood the consequences 
of their decision, they do not have to explain in detail why they wish to refuse 
treatment. Patients can refuse any treatment, even life-sustaining treatment, 
“for reasons which are rational, irrational, or for no reasons.”  14  In the case of 
incompetent patients, advance statements that refuse specifi c treatments are 
legally binding in English law, provided the patient had suffi ciently compre-
hended the situation at the time the statement was made.  15  Only in situations 
in which there are doubts about the consistency and clarity of a patient’s previ-
ously expressed wish may the court decide to overrule the patient’s advance 
decision to refuse treatment.  16  
 Since the Mental Capacity Act of 2005, which came into force in England and 
Wales in 2007, written advance decisions to refuse treatment have become legally 
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introduced advance decisions as a way of enhancing the autonomy of patients 
who had become incompetent. In the absence of such an advance decision, 
according to  section 4 of the act, an incompetent patient’s treatment should be 
made in his or her “best interests”; this means that the physician should balance 
medical benefi ts with the person’s past and present wishes, feelings, beliefs, 
values, and any other factor the person would consider if he or she were able to do 
so. The doctor should also take into account the opinion of any other person, such 
as relatives and close friends, who could contribute to determining what would be 
in this particular person’s best interests. 
 Legal Approaches to End-of-Life Practices in France 
 In France, the law on patients’ rights [loi sur les droits des patients] of 2002 
(law no. 2002-303) introduced the right to refuse treatment.  17  Many French physi-
cians, however, claimed that it was uncertain as to whether this right included the 
right to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatments.  18  The 2005 law on 
patients’ rights and the end of life [loi sur les droits des patients et la fi n de vie] 
(law no. 2005-370) came as an attempt to clarify this confusion. It stipulated that a 
patient has the right to refuse  any treatment, including clinically assisted nutrition 
and hydration (Public Health Code Article L.1111-4).  19  Although the 2005 law 
specifi es that the doctor has to respect the patient’s wishes, it also states that, 
where the refusal of treatment endangers the patient’s life, the doctor should 
“do all that is possible in order to convince the patient” to continue the treatment. 
It is not specifi ed what doing “all that is possible” actually means, or how far the 
doctor should go to convince the patient to continue treatment. “In any case,” says 
the law, “the patient has to repeat his/her decision after a reasonable lapse of 
time” (Public Health Code Article L.1111-4). As the legal scholar Thouvenin points 
out, these restrictions express ambivalence toward the recognition of subjective 
patients’ rights—that is, toward the recognition of the patient as the actual right 
holder.  20  
 The reluctance to rely on the patient’s choice is also apparent in the legal status 
of advance decisions to refuse treatment in France. The 2005 law stipulates that all 
competent patients can compose such a document. However, unlike in England, 
advance decisions are currently not legally binding in France. Article L.1111-11 of 
the Public Health Code states that they “should be taken into account” by the 
physician. Prior to taking into account the advance decision, the doctor is advised 
to consult a colleague, as well as the patient’s representative, family, or close 
friends. However, it is made clear that it is the physician alone who makes the 
decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. Despite many attempts 
in recent years to strengthen patient rights in France, a strong commitment to pro-
tect the vulnerable person and to delegate responsibilities to the physician remains 
the leading element in regulating end-of-life decisions.  21  
 Looking at the legal landscape regarding end-of-life practices and advance deci-
sions in England and France, one could argue that although both countries are 
committed to protecting patient dignity in end-of-life care, their way of achieving 
this aim is different. In England, patient rights appear to take center stage, whereas 
in France, the doctors’ duty to safeguard vulnerable individuals is stronger.  22 , 23  
Because it is the call for respect for dignity that is mainly driving decisions and 
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way the term “dignity” is commonly used in bioethical reports and medical guide-
lines in these two countries. 
 Dignity in the English End-of-Life Context: Policies and Guidelines 
 A helpful defi nition of how human dignity is understood in the English medical 
context comes from the Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics. In a 2002 report the council 
asserts that “an essential ingredient in the conception of human dignity, is the 
presumption that one is a person whose actions, thoughts and concerns are 
worthy of intrinsic respect, because they have been chosen, organised and guided 
in a way which makes sense from a distinctively individual point of view.”  24  
According to this defi nition, a person’s intrinsic worth, and hence dignity, stems 
from his or her capacity for autonomy and self-determination. The same under-
standing of dignity is echoed by the General Medical Council (GMC). The GMC 
prompts doctors working in end-of-life care to “treat patients as individuals and 
respect their dignity” by listening and responding to their concerns, by giving 
patients information in an appropriate way, and by respecting their right to make 
their own decision.  25  For both the Nuffi eld Council and the GMC, treating people 
with dignity is mainly understood as facilitating, supporting, and promoting their 
ability and, by extension, their right to choose for themselves and have their 
choices respected. 
 In 2008 “distressing reports of people not being treated with dignity and respect 
[and the fact that] many people do not die where they would choose to”  26  prompted 
the publication of a report entitled “End of Life Strategy.” Although other facets of 
dignity, such as treating the body with dignity or respecting a person’s religious 
conviction, are mentioned in the “End of Life Strategy” document, the importance 
of treating someone as an individual with choices and preferences remains the 
main message of this report.  27  
 In addition, the right of the individual to self-determination was successfully 
defended by Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. in the Bland case:
 The patient’s interest consists of his right to self-determination . . . , even 
if it will damage his health or lead to his premature death. Society’s inter-
est is in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and that it 
should be preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in the 
ultimate the right of the individual is paramount.  28  
 In the liberal, rights-based context of English culture,  29  dignity is often associated 
with self-governance. The rights of patients to take control over their lives and 
make their own autonomous decisions resonate with England’s philosophical and 
political tradition. The protection of the individual’s right of liberty against public 
authorities has been established since the Magna Carta in 1215. As stated else-
where,  30  this right has been backed up by important English thinkers such as 
Locke, who argued that no authority should intervene in the private life of a 
person,  31  and Mill, according to whom a person should be free to act autono-
mously, as long as he or she does not restrain the liberty of others.  32  
 As we will see in the next section, France takes a different approach to dignity. In the 
French context, the person is more embedded in society, and the emphasis is on the 
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 Dignity in the French End-of-Life Context: Policies and Guidelines 
 The oldest meaning of the word “dignity” refers to a set of qualities and distinc-
tions possessed by people of nobility and those in the higher ranks of society. 
Kings, ministers, bishops, and doctors had special dignities that came with their 
roles and positions.  34  The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
(1789), issued as a result of the French Revolution, challenged this defi nition. 
It extended dignities to all people regardless of their class or rank, based on the 
idea that all humans shared a common nature and were equal in the eyes of the 
law. According to Article 6:
 Law is the expression of the general will. . . . It must be the same to all 
whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the 
law, are equally eligible to all dignities and for all public positions and 
occupations, according to their capacities, and without other distinction 
than that of their virtues and talents.  35  
 As McCrudden shows, respect for all humans beings’ equal dignity is central to 
French Republicanism, which has been strongly infl uenced by Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s idea of the social contract.  36  The republican state—which, according to 
Rousseau, represents the general will of every citizen—assumes a particular role 
in protecting equality and guaranteeing the rights of all. Rousseau’s philosophy 
appears to have contributed to a more egalitarian or communitarian understand-
ing of dignity. Citing Carozza, McCrudden points to the distinctive aspects of 
the communitarian understanding of dignity, which is known for “‘exhibit[ing] 
more concern for equality and fraternity, and less exclusive emphasis on liberty’ 
than that prevalent in North American traditions.”  37  
 This particular meaning of dignity and the state’s role in protecting the dignity 
of its citizens, regardless of their race, age, gender, beliefs or physical condition, is 
still perceptible in contemporary French legal, ethical and political debates.  38  
 In 1994, dignity was introduced in French law as a “principle of constitutional 
value.” Three so-called laws on bioethics ( lois dites de bioéthique ), governing the 
protection of personal data, the respect for the human body, and the donation and 
use of body parts, were adopted in 1994; these laws referred to dignity as the 
intrinsic value of each person. Since then, Article 16 of the Civil Code has stipu-
lated that the law prohibits any harm to a person’s dignity and guarantees respect 
for all humans, right from the beginning of their life. Also since 1995, Article 38 of 
the Code of Medical Deontology (Code de Déontologie Médicale) emphasizes that 
it is the doctor’s duty to assure a dying patient’s dignity, without, however, inten-
tionally hastening his or her death. This article is integrated into the Public Health 
Code (Article L.1111-4). 
 In 2000, the French National Ethics Committee (Conseil Consultatif National 
d’Ethique) published a report on “end-of-life, ending life, euthanasia” (  fi n de vie, 
arrêt de vie, euthanasie ) in which it stresses the intrinsic value of human dignity, 
which ought to be protected by the doctor.  39  According to the committee, physi-
cians are representatives of the society ( corps social ), and their role is to “defend 
and promote common values, without which there would be neither group nor 
society.”  40  
 Three parliamentary reports on end-of-life issues discuss the different use of the 
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understood in an individualistic way, denoting each person’s views regarding the 
value of life. The report acknowledges that many proponents of euthanasia use 
this defi nition of dignity to support their arguments. The alternative understand-
ing of dignity, however, signifi es the notion of dignity as an intrinsic characteristic 
of human life, an unalienated quality that all humans share and that cannot be lost 
or diminished. This is the notion of dignity that opponents of euthanasia usually 
invoke. 
 All three reports tend to favor the meaning of dignity as an intrinsic quality of 
human life. As Vincent Lamanda, the president of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
maintains: “Human dignity does not imply the liberty to choose one’s own life or 
death but is the very condition of this liberty . . . the principle of dignity justifi es 
the limitation of a person’s liberty.”  44  
 The French National Ethics Committee, in a 2013 report, states that the different 
meanings of dignity are not a priori contrary to each other.  45  When a person per-
ceives his or her situation as undignifi ed, the committee, public authority, and 
society should be mobilized to improve such situations: “The most undignifi ed 
situation would be to consider the other as being undignifi ed because they are ill, 
different, alone, unproductive, costly.”  46  Yet the committee argues that the idea 
that a person’s dignity might be restored by helping him or her to die infringes on 
that meaning of dignity that guarantees the equal value of every human being, 
regardless of his or her condition. 
 The understanding of dignity as a value that is intrinsic to every human being 
and that should be protected by public authorities or representatives of society 
directs not only the debate but also the law and policies on end-of-life practices in 
France. 
 Given the differences in the way dignity is understood in England and France, 
it is worth looking deeper into these two different understandings of the term. 
 The Elusive Meaning of Dignity 
 Dignity is often described as an elusive concept.  47  In particular, distinguishing 
between the concepts of autonomy and dignity has presented a signifi cant chal-
lenge to many scholars. Some authors have argued that the two notions often col-
lapse into one. Therefore, because autonomy is much easier to defi ne, it has been 
suggested that the concept of dignity is redundant and should be removed.  48  
 Many philosophers have taken it upon themselves to articulate the exact mean-
ing of dignity, and they have proposed a number of different defi nitions of the 
term.  49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54  Two particular notions of dignity seem to emerge from looking 
at England’s and France’s end-of-life debates: dignity as respect for humanity and 
dignity as respect for autonomy. 
 Dignity as Respect for Humanity 
 Immanuel Kant was the philosopher who put dignity and respect for persons 
at the center of moral theory. For Kant, human dignity ( Menschenwürde ) is the 
supreme value that all humans possess in virtue of their humanity—that is, in 
virtue of their rational nature, being beings capable of rational thinking, auton-
omous choices, and moral actions.  55  It is these capabilities, innate to human 
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A person’s dignity can be neither lost nor diminished.  56  As Neumann notes, 
a person “has all the moral dignity and value a self can have . . . because it operates 
only according to universal and necessary principles, the same ones for all rational 
beings.”  57  It is this ability for self-legislation, rather than the capacity to pursue 
individual goals, that endows all humans with dignity. 
 Dignity as respect for humanity is a value that has been used to defend situa-
tions in which individual decisions and rights are curtailed. Human dignity was 
invoked, most famously, in the dwarf-tossing case in France. Although Manuel 
Wackenheim, the dwarf who was making his living by hiring himself to be tossed, 
appealed and even took his case to the International Committee on Civil and 
Political Rights, the committee ruled against him, on the grounds that banning 
dwarf tossing was necessary for the protection of human dignity.  58  
 France’s tendency to surrender individual rights in order to protect societal 
cohesion and egalitarianism fi ts with the understanding of dignity that demands 
respect for humanity as a whole. Respecting dignity means respecting the human-
ity of every single person who forms the group, rather than the right of each indi-
vidual to act independently. 
 Dignity as Respect for Autonomy 
 It is the close relationship between the notions of humanity and autonomy that 
has given rise to the second understanding of dignity we discuss in this article: 
that of dignity as respect for autonomy.  59  
 Autonomy comes from the Greek words  α υ τ ό ς , meaning “self,” and  ν ό μ ο ς , which 
means “law.” An autonomous person is a self-governing person who decides 
and is accountable for her actions. Kant described autonomy as the human capac-
ity to govern one’s life in accordance to rational principles.  60  But, according to 
Kant, it is practical reason, as exercised through autonomy, that determines 
our moral obligations toward ourselves and others.  61  For Mill, however, auton-
omy is the basis of intrinsic value independent of practical reason. He argued that 
the capacity for autonomy is one of the main characteristics that differentiate 
humans from other animals, and that they also endow human life with special 
moral value.  62  
 In Mill’s theory, autonomy is what underlies human dignity:
 He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for 
him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. 
He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, 
activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and 
when he has decided, fi rmness and self-control to hold his deliberate 
decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises in proportion as 
the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judge-
ment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in 
some good path, and kept out of harm’s way, without any of these things. 
But what will be his comparative worth as a human being?  63  
 The English model of end-of-life care seems to favor the view of dignity as respect 
for autonomy. The best way to honor human beings and show due esteem for their 
dignity is to recognize them as autonomous individuals, and allow them to pur-
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of their lives, the appropriate way of treating them is allowing them to keep 
pursuing their own individual accounts of the good life until the end, and even 
beyond. 
 Conclusion 
 Our analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the English and French attitudes 
toward end-of-life decisions reveal a difference in the accounts of dignity adopted 
by the two countries. In the English context, dignity is mainly, yet not exclusively, 
understood as respect for a person’s autonomy. This has led to laws and practices 
that safeguard patients’ decisional autonomy, and that recognize the precedence 
of individual rights over the interests of society. 
 In the French context, dignity seems primarily to signify respect for humanity. 
As Renouvier states, the republican ideal “reconciles the interests and the dignity 
of each individual with the interests and dignity of everyone.”  64  The emphasis is 
thus on respecting the intrinsic value of human life, the unalienated property that 
is equally shared by all human beings. The state’s responsibility is to preserve 
public order through the protection of human dignity, even if this means limiting 
individual liberties. Applied to end-of-life decisions and the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, patients’ individual choices give way to the doctors’ responsibility to 
promote social values, such as the protection of patients’ welfare. 
 Protecting and respecting human dignity is central in many European and inter-
national declarations and guidelines regarding end-of-life issues. Given that the 
role of these guidelines is the alignment of law and practice across countries, 
understanding the contextual meaning of central concepts such as dignity will 
help anticipate how these guidelines could be implemented locally. 
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